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INTRODUCTION
Imagine being an inmate on death row. Days away from your
execution, you learn that the United States government has violated its
obligation under Article 36 the Vienna Convention on Consular
Relations (“the VCCR”) by withholding notification of your arrest to
your nation’s consulate. Little did you know, this right to consular
notification had the potential of gaining you diplomatic intervention, help
with translation, and possibly even legal assistance. However, based on
the domestic treatment of Article 36 violations, learning about your right
to consular notification at this stage renders it meaningless. Although
you will face many procedural and substantive bars in bringing a
successful claim, this is your last chance of legal justice as a death row
inmate. This is the typical backdrop of Article 36 claims. Thus far,
except for one case, the result has also been typical: denial of Article 36
rights.
The VCCR is a 79-article treaty signed by 170 nations covering the
protocol concerning consular or ambassador relations and the privileges
and immunities enjoyed by consular officers and staff.1 Nations adhere to
this protocol in their pursuit of friendly international relations and the
maintenance of international peace.2 Article 36 of the VCCR requires
local authorities to notify all detained foreigners without delay of their
right to have their consulate or embassy notified of their detention.3
Article 36 has been hotly contested because it deviates from the general
scope of the treaty by focusing on a foreign national’s rights when
arrested in a foreign country as opposed to diplomatic and consular
privileges and immunities encapsulated in the rest of the treaty.4
Recently, there has been a flood of Article 36 litigation involving
the availability of criminal and civil remedies under Article 36. In Breard
v. Greene5, the Supreme Court stated that Article 36 conferred a foreign
1

The Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, Apr. 24, 1969, 21 U.N.T.S. 77
[hereinafter VCCR].
2
Id.
3
Id. at Art.36.
4
Id.
5
Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998).
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national with an individual right as compared to the general purpose of
the VCCR’s text which outlines consular immunities and privileges and
makes no mention of individuals and their rights.6 The Court conferred
this individual right upon a foreign national in the criminal context but
did not address the availability of criminal remedies.7 Moreover,
subsequent cases have hindered the progress of Article 36 claims by
creating a number of procedural and substantive hoops. Specifically, the
procedural default doctrine, a common procedural hurdle that many
courts have used to bar Article 36 litigation from moving forward, bars
Article 36 claims not first raised in State courts and the prejudice test
which places an undue burden on the foreign national in showing that he
was not aware of this right.8 Even so, foreign nationals who overcome
the procedural default doctrine and prejudice test hurdles are not awarded
with remedies they seek, such as suppression of evidence or reversal of
indictment.9
This disheartenment with the lack of criminal remedies under
Article 36 has led foreign nationals to file civil claims under 42 U.S.C. §
1983 and the Alien Tort Claims Act (“ATCA”).10 With no guidance from
the Supreme Court regarding civil remedies under Article 36, there
remains a circuit split regarding whether Article 36 in fact confers an
individual right to recover civil damages and if so, what the civil
remedies would be and the procedure by which a foreign national would
bring such a civil claim. Specifically, the Fifth, Sixth, and Second
Circuits have held that there is no civil right of Article 36 compliance,
while the Seventh Circuit has held that a foreign national does indeed
have a civil right under Article 36 and can assert a claim under § 1983
and ATCA.11
The recent influx of VCCR litigation clogging federal and state
court dockets makes it very likely that there are specific litigation
strategies at play. Specifically, creating awareness of the United States’
disregard for international law, especially it’s reluctance to adhere to
international law when it concerns human rights violations, creating a
6

Id.
Id.
8
See Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006) (holding that the
exclusionary rule does not apply as a remedy).
9
Id.
10
See Jogi v. Voges, 425 F.3d 367 (7th Cir. 2005) [hereinafter Jogi I]; Brief of
Plaintiff-Appellant, Mora v. The People of New York, No. 06-0431 (2nd Cir. Dec. 21,
2006).
11
See generally Jogi I, 425 F.3d 367 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Jimenez-Nava,
243 F.3d 192 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Emuegbunam, 268 F.3d 377 (6th Cir.
2001); Mora v. People of New York, 524 F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2008).
7
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storm of federal circuit litigation and circuit splits on Article 36 issues
thereby forcing the Supreme Court to grant certiorari on the narrow issue
of whether Article 36 contains an individual right, and which criminal
and civil remedies are appropriate, if any. These litigation strategies also
serve as proxy enforcement mechanisms by the international community
which is motivated by it’s disbelief and growing concern over the United
States’ failure to abide by its international legal obligations.
Consequently, this comment uses the VCCR as a microscope to
magnify and analyze United States’ compliance in international legal
matters. Part I of this comment discusses the VCCR’s text, purpose and
drafting history with a focus on Article 36, the center of immense
controversy. This comment argues, in light of the interpretation of the
United States Constitution, federal statutes, and international legal
authority that Article 36 does imply a private cause of action. Part II
explores the scope and availability criminal remedies under Article 36 of
the Vienna Convention through discussing the recent Supreme Court
cases and the ICJ rulings. Part III addresses the current circuit split on the
issue of Article 36’s grant of a civil right of action focusing on the Jogi v.
Voges and Mora v. People of New York cases as well as mechanisms to
enforce civil remedies such as § 1983 and the ATCA. This comment
analyzes the sophisticated litigation strategies at play as both a proxy
enforcement mechanism and a death row prisoner’s last chance. Part IV
analyzes why the VCCR is being used as a litigation strategy and
addresses the recent influx of VCCR litigation in state and federal courts.
By comparing United States’ deference to international law in the
international trade context with its utter disregard for international law in
the human rights arena, this comment aims to use the VCCR as a lens
through which to forecast United States’ behavior in the international law
arena. Each section in this comment inevitably advocates for the
proclamation of an individual right under Article 36, and consequently
counter argues each argument put forward by opponents of Article 36’s
power to grant individual rights. Finally, Part V presents the most
prevalent obstacles faced by VCCR litigants and proposes solutions that
all three branches of government can implement in order to bring the
United States closer to fulfilling its international legal obligations. For
example, accountability at the executive level, reformulation of threshold
tests at the judicial level, and implementation of international doctrines
into domestic laws at the legislative level.
THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONSULAR RELATIONS
The VCCR, entered into force on December 24, 1969, has a
checkered background surrounding its adoption. The most significant
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reason for the lengthy and heated debates leading up to the VCCR’s
adoption can be attributed to Article 36’s controversial language. A
closer look at the history of the VCCR and Article 36, the United States’
position on Article 36 and the United States’ subsequent enforcement
shows that Article 36’s language confers an individual right for foreign
nationals.
The VCCR is a 79-article multilateral treaty covering “consular
relations, privileges, and immunities” for consular officers and staff.12
There are currently 170 signatory nations to the VCCR including the
United States.13 The privileges and immunities the VCCR lays out serve
to facilitate consular personnel’s ability to carry out consular functions.
These functions include protecting the sending State’s interest in the
receiving State within the ambit of international law and “furthering the
development of commercial, economic, cultural and scientific relations
between the sending State and the receiving State.”14 Through the
VCCR, its signatories aim to achieve and maintain friendly and
diplomatic relations.15 While the VCCR generally covers privileges and
immunities of consular personnel, Article 36 speaks of individual rights
of foreign nationals at the time of detainment or arrest.16 Amidst
extensive debate and discussion surrounding the adoption of Article 36,
many nations vehemently opposed Article 36’s inclusion in the VCCR,
while other nations passionately supported the inclusion.17 Consequently,
the placement of Article 36 in the VCCR was not an oversight by the
drafters.
Text of Article 36
Article 36 is divided into three sections with each section defining
the rights of a foreign national. The first right is one between the national
of the sending State (the foreign national) and the consular officer of the
sending State. There is a reciprocal right of communication. The foreign
national has “the freedom . . . to [communicate] with and have access to

12

VCCR art. 36, supra note 1.
Id.
14
Id.
15
Id.
16
Id.
17
Mark J. Kadish, Article 36 of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: A
Search for the Right to Consul, 18 MICH J. INT’L L. 565, 597–98 (2000) (discussing the
debate over individual rights that took place in the committee debates as well as plenary
meetings). Ironically, among Article 36’s greatest supporters was the United States.
13
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consular officers of the sending State” and consular officers are given the
same freedom with regard to nationals of the sending State.18
The second right is between the foreign national and the detaining
or arresting authorities of the receiving State. Upon the foreign national’s
request, the “competent authorities of the receiving State shall, without
delay, inform the consular . . . [officials] of the sending State . . . that a
national of that State is arrested or committed to prison or to custody
pending trial or is detained in any other manner.”19 Furthermore, “any
communication addressed to the consular post by the [foreign national] .
. . shall also be forwarded . . . without delay. . . . [And] the said
authorities shall inform the [foreign national] without delay of his rights
under this [section].”20 Under this right, upon the foreign national’s
request, it is the duty of officials to notify the consular official’s of the
foreign national’s home country of the foreign national’s arrest along
with any other communication the foreign national deems should be
forwarded to the consulate on his behalf.21
The third right deals with visitation between the foreign national
and the consular officers of the sending State. Article 36 states: “consular
officers shall have the right to visit a national of the sending State who is
in prison, custody or detention, to converse and correspond with him and
to arrange for his legal representation. . . . [Or] in pursuance of a
judgment.”22 The third right is strictly limited to the approval of the
foreign national.23

18

VCCR art. 36(1)(a), supra note 1 (“[C]onsular officers shall be free to
communicate with nationals of the sending State and to have access to them. Nationals of
the sending State shall have the same freedom with respect to communication with and
access to consular officers of the sending State.”).
19
VCCR art. 36(1)(b), supra note 1 (“[I]f he so requests, the competent authorities of
the receiving State shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State if,
within its consular district, a national of that State is arrested or committed to prison or to
custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner. Any communication addressed
to the consular post by the person arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall also be
forwarded by the said authorities without delay. The said authorities shall inform the
person concerned without delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph.”) (emphasis
added).
20
Id. (emphasis added).
21
Id.
22
VCCR art. 36(1)(c), supra note 1 (“[C]onsular officers shall have the right to visit
a national of the sending State who is in prison, custody or detention, to converse and
correspond with him and to arrange for his legal representation. They shall also have the
right to visit any national of the sending State who is in prison, custody or detention in
their district in pursuance of a judgment. Nevertheless, consular officers shall refrain
from taking action on behalf of a national who is in prison, custody or detention if he
expressly opposes such action.”).
23
Id.
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Article 36 next outlines the parameters of the applicable law used to
enforce Article 36 violations by stating: “The rights . . . shall be
exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving
State [conditioned on the premise that] . . . said laws and regulations
must enable full effect to be given to the purpose for which the rights
accorded under this Article are intended.”24 Article 36’s language of
“rights” stirred up such heated debate that the Article was completely
removed from the original draft of the treaty only to be added in just two
days before the closing of the Convention.25 Further interpretation of the
VCCR requires a review of the drafting history as well as the United
States’ position towards Article 36.
History of the Vienna Convention and Article 36
The VCCR delegates engaged in protracted dialogue before finally
adopting Article 36 with its current language.26 In committee meetings,
several nations expressed concern over the individual rights implied in
Article 36.27 In particular, an amendment proposed by Venezuela
received a great deal of attention.28 The proposed amendment eliminated
the first right: the freedom of reciprocal communication between the
foreign national and consular officials of his nation.29 The proponents of
the Venezuelan amendment argued that an article establishing a foreign
national’s individual rights was misplaced given the general scope of the
treaty as a document detailing the rights and protections of consular
officials.30 Nonetheless, the Venezuelan amendment received strong
opposition, and the reciprocal freedom of communication right remained
intact.31

24
VCCR art. 36(2), supra note 1 (“The rights referred to in paragraph 1 of this
Article shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the receiving
State, subject to the proviso, however, that the said laws and regulations must enable full
effect to be given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this Article are
intended.”) (emphasis added).
25
Kadish, supra note 17, at 570–71.
26
See Jogi v. Voges, 480 F. 3d 822, 829 (7th Cir. 2007); [hereinafter Jogi II]; U. N.
CONFERENCE ON CONSULAR RELATIONS, OFFICIAL RECORDS at 3, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 2
5/6, U.N. Sales. No. 63.X.2. (1963).
27
Kadish, supra note 17, at 597–98.
28
Id.
29
Id.
30
Id.; See also ILC, Summary Records of 535th Meeting, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/Sr.535
at 48–49 (1960) (“[Article 36 is] related to the basic function of the consul to protect his
nationals vis-à-vis the local authorities and to regard the question as one involving
primarily human rights or the status of aliens would be to confuse the issue.”).
31
VCCR, supra note 1.
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An additional subject of debate was the language “if he so requests”
contained in Article 36’s second section.32 Many nations pushed for the
notification requirement to the sending State’s consular officials to be
mandatory instead of elective in order to shield these nations from due
process attacks.33 Once again, the contested language remained (“if he so
requests”) over the resistance of opposing nations.34
Unfortunately, there was never a consensus on Article 36’s
underlying meaning. This is illustrated by the United States’ position in
Mora v. People of New York.35 In Mora, the United States submitted an
amicus brief arguing that the purpose of Article 36’s notification
requirement as elective was not to confer an individual right on a foreign
national.36 Instead, the United States argued that the delegates
incorporated the language “if he so requests” into Article 36 to ease the
significant burden of receiving States that have large tourist and
immigrant populations.37 This argument and the argument in support of
Article 36 containing an individual right rely on the same authority.38
Thus, the VCCR’s drafting history left little in the way of determining a
clear grant of individual rights under Article 36.
The VCCR’s Preamble and Article 36’s language create another
inconsistency. The Preamble states, in pertinent part: “[T]he purpose of
such privileges and immunities is not to benefit individuals but to ensure
the efficient performance of functions by consular posts on behalf of
their respective States.”39 The delegates passed a resolution at the Vienna
Convention clarifying the meaning of the Preamble.40 The resolution
implies that the Preamble merely establishes the immunities and
privileges that protect consular personnel. The Preamble warns that
nations should not use these privileges and immunities as shelter against
wrongdoing.41 The Preamble’s language did not disallow Article 36
rights. Furthermore, the Preamble of the VCCR in and of itself is not
conclusive in establishing the absence of foreign nationals’ individual
rights under Article 36.42

32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42

Id.
Kadish, supra note 17, at 597–98.
Id.
Mora v. People of New York, 524 F.3d 183 (2008).
1 OFFICIAL RECORDS at 36–38, 81–86, 336–40.
Id.
VCCR, Art. 36 supra note 1.
VCCR pmbl., supra note 1.
Kadish, supra note 17, at 597–98.
Id. at 594–96.
Id.
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In addition, during the ratification process, the United States was a
zealous advocate for individual rights of foreign nationals under Article
36.43 The United States delegate proposed an amendment to Article 36’s
right of consular notification at the request of the foreign national; the
delegate suggested that the request be made “to protect the rights of the
national concerned.”44 Furthermore, in the United States’ letter of
transmittal ratifying the VCCR, Secretary of State William P. Rodgers
indicated that Article 36 provided an individual right.45 In the letter, he
wrote: “Article 36 requires that authorities of the receiving State inform
the person detained of his right to have the fact of his detention reported
to the consular post concerned and of his right to communicate with that
consular post.”46 Finally, the U.S. Vienna Report explained that the
consular notification requirement “is not beyond the means of practical
implementation in the United States.”47 Whether the United States has
practically implemented the VCCR is a question for further review.
United States Enforcement of Article 36
The United States Department of State (“DOS”) has devoted
considerable attention and resources toward creating awareness of
Article 36’s mandatory notice requirements.48 For example, the DOS
manual instructs law enforcement officials to treat a foreign national the
way an American citizen would expect to be treated in a foreign
country.49 The DOS highlights such treatment as “prompt, courteous
notification to the foreign national of the possibility of consular
assistance and prompt, courteous notification to the foreign national’s
nearest consular official . . . .”50 The DOS has also provided law
enforcement officials with a list of countries in which mandatory
notification of consular officials is required, even if the foreign national
does not request it.51 The manual further notes that DOS occasionally
receives inquiries from foreign governments concerning foreign
nationals in detention.52 To address the inquiries, the DOS requires a
43

Id. at 597–98.
Jogi II, 480 F.3d at 830.
45
Id.
46
Id. (emphasis added).
47
Id.
48
BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEPT. OF STATE, CONSULAR NOTIFICATION
ACCESS
(2008),
available
at
AND
http://travel.state.gov/law/consular/consular_737.html#requirements.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id.
44
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recorded confirmation of receipt of notification to respond to inquiries of
foreign nationals and to assist foreign nationals if notification issues arise
in litigation.53 Finally, the DOS has included a set of frequently asked
questions to emphasize the importance of Article 36’s notification
requirement.54
For example, the DOS has clarified that law enforcement officials
must notify a consular official even if a law enforcement official has
given Miranda warnings.55 The DOS has listed various remedies that
may be available for violating the notification requirement, such as
discussing the matter in which the foreign government was involved,
apologizing on the United States’ behalf, or seeking to improve future
compliance.56 In addition to the DOS guidelines, some states have
implemented statutory provisions making Article 36 notification
mandatory.57
Through a plain reading of the text of Article 36 itself, it is clear
that the drafters intended to articulate the provisions contained in Article
36 as a foreign national’s rights and a violation resulting therefrom to be
remedied by the laws of a particular country. Furthermore, during intense
debates surrounding the adoption of Article 36 in the text of the VCCR,
United States was one of the greatest advocates for the adoption of an
Article containing individual rights for foreign nationals. Moreover,
recognizing the importance of Article 36 for foreign nationals, the DOS
has extensively covered the role of local authorities in fulfilling Article
36 obligations in its manual.
Despite the numerous efforts to emphasize the importance of
notification at the federal and state levels, compliance with Article 36’s
notification requirement has been intermittent, and there has been no
meaningful penalty for non-compliance at the local level.58 It follows
then, that even though the United States disagreed with other signatories
53

BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, supra note 48.
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 834 (c) (“California law enforcement agencies shall
ensure that policy or procedure and training manuals incorporate language based upon
provisions of the treaty that set forth requirements for handling the arrest and booking or
detention for more than two hours of a foreign national pursuant to this section prior to
December 31, 2000.”); FLA.STAT.ANN.§ 288.816(2)(f) (“Establish a system of
communication to provide all state and local law enforcement agencies with information
regarding proper procedures relating to the arrest or incarceration of a foreign citizen.”).
58
BARBARA H. BEAN, GUIDE TO VIENNA CONVENTION ON CONSULAR RELATIONS
NOTIFICATION
REQUIREMENT
(2007),
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/Vienna_Convention_Consular_Relations.htm#_I.
_Introduction.
54
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regarding the inclusion of Article 36’s language granting individual
rights and asserted that Article 36 was not beyond practical
implementation, the United States is seriously lagging behind in its
efforts to provide foreign nationals with those very rights.
Foreign nationals and their home countries, who believed their
rights under Article 36 were violated, have sought criminal remedies in
federal and state courts. A summation of what resulted from this wave of
VCCR litigation follows.
CRIMINAL REMEDIES UNDER THE VIENNA CONVENTION
The facts of Article 36 non-compliance cases have become
commonplace: a criminal defendant seeks a criminal remedy for an
Article 36 violation in a habeas corpus proceeding.59 The Supreme Court
has not yet allowed foreign nationals to obtain the criminal remedies they
seek by often dismissing the case before a remedy determination even
begins. An in-depth look at the most notable Article 36 cases, Breard v.
Greene; Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon; and the ICJ cases of Avena and
LaGrand, clarify the procedural and substantive hurdles a foreign
national must overcome before there is any hope of a meaningful
remedy. Although these hurdles are difficult to overcome, the Supreme
Court has arguably conceded that Article 36 does create a individual
right for a foreign national, but has severely limited its holding to a
narrow issue of a specific criminal remedy thereby circumventing the
ICJ’s guidance to the Supreme Court in its Avena and LaGrand
decisions.
Breard v. Greene
In Breard v. Greene,60 the Supreme Court concluded without
ultimately resolving the issue, that Article 36 “arguably confers on an
individual a right to consular assistance following arrest.”61 Breard, a
Paraguay citizen living in the United States, was convicted of attempted
rape and capital murder and was sentenced to death.62 In his habeas
corpus petition, Breard argued that both his conviction and sentence
should be overturned because law enforcement officials had failed to
inform him of his rights under Article 36 of the VCCR.63 The Fourth
Circuit concluded that Breard’s claim was procedurally defaulted
because in order to raise an Article 36 violation on appeal, the claim
59
60
61
62
63

Jogi II, 480 F.3d at 831.
Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371, 376 (1998).
Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 373.
Id. at 373–74.
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must have been raised in the state court and Breard failed to raise the
claim in state court and also lacked a showing of cause and prejudice for
this default.64 The prejudice showing the court required is a three-prong
test in which: first, the foreign national must establish that “he did not
know of his right to consult with consular officials.” Second, had the
foreign national known of the right, “he would have availed himself of
that right. . . .” and third, “there is a likelihood that the contact would
have resulted in assistance. . . .”65
Five years following Breard’s conviction, the Republic of Paraguay
and the Consul General of Paraguay initiated suit against Virginia
officials66 alleging a violation of their separate rights.67 Additionally, the
Republic of Paraguay instituted proceedings against the United States in
the International Court of Justice (“ICJ”) (now World Court) alleging
that the United States violated the VCCR at the time of Bread’s arrest.68
The ICJ issued an order requesting that the United States “take all
measures at its disposal to ensure . . . Breard is not executed pending the
final decision in these proceedings.”69 The Supreme Court held that in
international law, “absent a clear and express statement to the contrary,
the procedural rules of the forum-State govern the implementation of the
treaty in that State.”70 According to the Supreme Court, this
pronouncement of international law is also held in the VCCR.71
Therefore, by applying the forum-State’s procedural rules the Supreme
Court also concluded that Breard defaulted his VCCR claim by not
asserting the Article 36 violation in state court.72 The Supreme Court also
64

Id. at 373; See also Breard v. Pruett, 134 F. 3d 615, 620 (4th Cir. 1998) The
procedural default doctrine is a common procedural hurdle that many courts have used to
bar Article 36 litigation from moving forward. Id.
65
Simma, infra note 250, at 37.
66
The ICJ’s role is to settle, in accordance with international law, legal disputes
submitted to it by States asserting a violation of the State’s right and to give advisory
opinions on legal questions referred to it by authorized United Nations organs and
specialized
agencies.
International
Court
of
Justice,
http://www.icjcij.org/court/index.php?p1=1&PHPSESSID=0d379fddb0ca63f7220a9b14d
539b3c4 (last visited on Dec. 18, 2008).
67
The Consul General also asserted a parallel claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983 alleging
a denial of rights under the Vienna Convention which the Court dismissed because
Paraguay is not a “person within the jurisdiction of the United States.” Breard, 523 U.S.
at 374.
68
Id. at 373.
69
Id. at 375.
70
Id.
71
Id. (noting that the Vienna Convention provides that the rights expressed in the
Convention “shall be exercised in conformity with the laws and regulations of the
receiving State, provided that said laws and regulations must enable full effect to be
given to the purposes for which the rights accorded under this rule are intended.”).
72
Breard, 523 U.S. at 375–76.
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rejected Breard’s Supremacy Clause argument,73 holding that an “Act of
Congress . . . is on full parity with a treaty, and that when a statute which
is subsequent in time is inconsistent with a treaty, the statute74 to the
extent of conflict renders the treaty null.”75 As a result, Breard provided
foreign nationals with two lessons: (1) they must raise Article 36 claims
in state court to make their claims reviewable at the appellate level, and
(2) a Supremacy Clause argument will not hold weight given the current
makeup of the Court. The Court’s decision Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon
added an extra hurdle for foreign nationals.76
Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon
In Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, the Supreme Court decided two
consolidated cases concerning Article 36 violations of the VCCR. In one
case, police arrested Sanchez-Llamas, a Mexican national, for shooting a
police officer in the leg during an exchange of gunfire.77 Police failed to
inform him that he could notify the Mexican consulate of his arrest.78
After his arrest, Sanchez-Llamas made several incriminating statements
during a police interrogation.79 Prior to trial, he moved to suppress these
statements, arguing that they were made involuntarily because of Article
36 noncompliance.80 The other case concerned Mario Bustillo, a
Honduran national who was arrested and eventually convicted of
murder.81 The arresting authorities never informed Bustillo of his right to
notify the Honduran consulate of his arrest.82
The Supreme Court declined to answer the question of whether the
VCCR granted enforceable individual rights because both SanchezLlamas and Bustillo were not entitled to any relief on their claims;
however, the Supreme Court noted in dicta that Article 36 does grant

73

Breard argued that the Supremacy Clause calls for the Vienna Convention to be the
supreme law of which effectively trumps the procedural default doctrine. Id.
74
Id. at 376. The court is referring to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act (AEDPA), which provides that “a habeas petitioner alleging that he is held in
violation of treaties of the United States will as a general rule, not be afforded an
evidentiary hearing if he ‘has failed to develop the factual basis of the claim in State
court proceeding.’” Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104–132, 110 Stat. 1214.
75
Id.
76
See generally Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. 331 (2006).
77
Id. at 340.
78
Id.
79
Id.
80
Id.
81
Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 341.
82
Id.
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such rights.83 The Court asserted that remedies, if any, shall be found
within the treaty itself, specifying that “where a treaty does not provide a
particular remedy, either expressly or implicitly, it is not for the federal
courts to impose one on the States through lawmaking of their own.”84
Therefore, the Court left open the question of whether Article 36
explicitly allows for individuals to recover remedies.
Moreover, Chief Justice Roberts, writing for the majority, conceded
that remedies under Article 36 should be granted in “conformity with the
laws and regulations of the receiving State,” stated that:
the exclusionary rule is not a remedy that the Supreme Court
applies lightly. [It] is applied primarily to deter constitutional
violations such as violations of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments
and not in situations like Article 36 violations, which is, if at all,
remotely connected to evidence gathering. Article 36 only
secures a right to notify consul and does not guarantee any
assistance by consul officials.85

Chief Justice Roberts further noted that non-compliance with
Article 36 is not likely to produce unreliable confessions and allowing
suppression to be a remedy would be grossly disproportionate for Article
36 non-compliance.86 Instead, he reasoned that it is unnecessary to apply
the exclusionary rule when other statutory and constitutional safeguards
are already in place to mitigate the possible effects of an Article 36
violation.87
Not content with the unavailability of remedies in the United States
court system, foreign nations began instituting proceedings in the
International Court of Justice, finding jurisdiction under the VCCR’s
Optional Protocol concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes.88

83

The Court rejected Sanchez’s request for suppression of evidence stating:
“Suppression of evidence, the relief which Sanchez-Llamas asks for is an ‘American
legal creation’ [] universally rejected by other countries. It is implausible that other
signatories to the Convention would have thought it to require a remedy that nearly all
refuse to recognize as a matter of domestic law. The Court does not have power to invoke
supervisory authority over state courts.” Id. at 394.
84
Id. at 347.
85
Id.
86
Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 349 (Giving examples of statutory and constitutional
safeguards such as the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause, the Fifth Amendment
protection against compelled self-incrimination, and the Sixth Amendment entitlement to
an attorney).
87
Id.
88
Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals Summary of the Judgment
of 31 March 2004, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/128/8190.pdf (last visited Jan. 15,
2009).
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International Court of Justice Rulings and its Effect on United States
Proceedings
After a line of cases including Breard and Sanchez-Llamas, foreign
nationals and their nations were convinced that the United States’
violation of the VCCR would go unremedied in domestic courts.
Therefore, in 1999, Germany sued for violations of the VCCR on behalf
of its citizens in the ICJ.89 By signing the VCCR optional protocol, the
United States submitted jurisdiction to the ICJ, which allowed other
nations to sue the United States for violations of international law in this
forum. The ICJ heard cases involving German nationals in the La Grand
case and Mexican nationals in the Avena case.90 The United States’
response to the ICJ rulings demonstrated extreme indifference to its
international law obligations.
In both decisions, the ICJ orders were similar. The ICJ focused on
three main issues: (1) the procedural default doctrine; (2) remedies
available; (3) and “review and consideration.”91 First, in La Grand, the
ICJ held that the procedural default doctrine violated Article 36(1) (b)92
because it deprived Germany the possibility of assisting the La Grand
brothers in a timely manner.93 The German consulate was only made
aware of their right to communicate with the foreign nationals under
Article 36 after the state proceedings had ended, and thus the procedural
default doctrine effectively barred Germany from assisting its nationals
in their defense.94 The ICJ held that in the future the United States Courts
should review and consider these cases with an eye towards whether the
foreign national was prejudiced by late notification of consulate.95

89
The ICJ is the principal judicial organ of the United Nations (UN). The ICJ was
established in June 1945 by the Charter of the United Nations and began work in April
1946. The Court’s role is to settle, in accordance with international law, legal disputes
submitted to it by States and to give advisory opinions on legal questions referred to it by
authorized United Nations organs and specialized agencies. International Court of Justice,
http://www.icjcij.org/court/index.php?p1=1&PHPSESSID=0d379fddb0ca63f7220a9b14d
539b3c4 (last visited on Dec. 18, 2008).
90
See Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. U.S.), 2004
I.C.J. 12 (March 31); La Grand Case (Germany v. U.S.) 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27).
91
See id.
92
See VCCR, supra note 1.
93
Fredric L. Kirgis, World Court Rules Against the United States in LaGrand Case
Arising from a Violation of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, ASIL, (July
2001), http://www.asil.org /insigh75.cfm.
94
Id.
95
Case concerning Avena and other Mexican nationals Summary of the Judgment of
31 March 2004, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/128/8190.pdf (last visited Jan. 25,
2008) (According to Article 36, notification to sending State’s consulate shall be made
“without delay”—in La Grand the notification to consulate was made after the state court
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Second, regarding remedies, the ICJ in Avena agreed with the Supreme
Court, albeit on different grounds,96 and held that the appropriate remedy
in VCCR cases would not be reversal of conviction and sentence because
it is not the foreign national’s conviction and sentence that is a violation
of international law, rather it is a breach of treaty obligations binding the
United States prior to the conviction and sentencing.97 Third, the ICJ in
Avena ordered that the United States, “by means of its own choosing
[should] allow the review and reconsideration of the conviction and
sentence.”98 The ICJ outlined the parameters in which the United States
can choose the review and reconsideration: “by taking account of the
violation of rights set forth in the Convention, including, in particular,
the question of legal consequences of the violation upon the criminal
proceedings that have followed the violation.”99 Furthermore, the ICJ
emphasized that review and reconsideration should be of both the
sentencing and conviction.100
In Avena, Mexico requested that the United States’ review and
reconsideration exclude “clemency,” the power of the President or a
governor to pardon a criminal or commute a criminal sentence.101
Mexico referred to clemency as “standardless, secretive and immune
from judicial oversight.”102 This description of clemency is accurate in
the sense that clemency power lies in the executive, not the judicial
branch of government and therefore executive clemency is divested of
substantive or procedural confinements.103 The executive branch does not
take a specific set of factors into consideration when deciding to grant or
deny clemency nor is there consistency in making the clemency

proceedings effectively barring defense counsel from asserting Article 36 noncompliance as a relief mechanism until after state court proceedings).
96
See generally Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. 331 (noting in dicta, that even if Article
36 created individual rights, reversal of conviction or sentence would not be a proper
remedy because of alternative constitutional and statutory safeguards already in place).
97
Case concerning Avena and other Mexican nationals Summary of the Judgment of
31 March 2004, http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/128/8190.pdf (last visited Jan. 25,
2008).
98
Id.
99
Id. (citation omitted).
100
Id.
101
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 269 (8th ed. 2004).
102
Cases Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. U.S.), 2004
I.C.J. 12, 64 (March 31).
103
Linda E. Carter, Compliance with ICJ Provisional Measures and the Meaning of
Review and Reconsideration under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: Avena
and other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.) 25 MICH. J. INT’L. L. 117, 128 (2003).
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determination between states.104 Moreover, a parole board or governor
has complete discretion to deny clemency without stating its reasons and
is precluded from judicial review.105 Clemency can be viewed both as a
blessing and a curse: a blessing as the “last check on injustice in the
criminal process” and a curse because it is hardly applied and is not a
reliable feature of the criminal justice system.106
Without procedural and substantive transparency, clemency
proceedings are unpredictable and ineffective remedies for VCCR
violations.107 Moreover, because Article 36 grants a foreign national’s
consulate the right to meet with the foreign national to assist in
proceedings against him and these proceedings are likely to take place in
a legal forum, the judicial branch becomes the heart of review and
reconsideration for VCCR remedies, not the executive branch.108
According to ICJ orders, the United States was obligated to conduct
review and reconsideration of La Grand and Avena decision and provide
meaningful remedies in the case of a VCCR violation.109 The United
States’ response to the ICJ rulings in La Grand reflects the United States’
reluctance to adhere to its international law obligations.110 First, the State
Department forwarded the order to Arizona’s Governor without any
comment, not even a plea for temporary stay of execution.111 Second, the
Supreme Court held that ICJ’s order is not binding on the Court. Third,
the Government of Arizona disregarded the Arizona Board of Executive
Clemency’s recommendation not to proceed with the execution. Instead,
Arizona officials executed LaGrand.112 This deliberately disregarded ICJ
orders of review and reconsideration of the conviction and sentence
because the Supreme Court held the ICJ order was not binding on the
Court. Consequently, this allowed the executive branch to engage in its
104

Id. at 129–30. For example, the former governor of Illinois recently commuted the
sentence of all 167 death row inmates in that state. In contrast, Texas has only stayed the
execution of one inmate of over 400 on death row. Id.
105
Id. at 131. Justice O’Connor stated that judicial review may be warranted in
circumstances where the clemency authority flipped a coin to determine whether to grant
clemency or “arbitrarily denied a prisoner any access to clemency process.” Id. This
demonstrates how unregulated the process is by judicial oversight.
106
Id. at 130.
107
Id. at 131.
108
See VCCR, supra note 1.
109
See Case Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. U.S.), 2004
I.C.J. 12 (March 31); La Grand Case (Germany v. U.S.) 2001 I.C.J. 466 (June 27).
110
Shortly after the LaGrand and Avena cases, the United States also withdrew from
the VCCR’s optional protocol thereby removing itself from the ICJ’s jurisdiction.
111
See Carter, supra note 103, at 124.
112
See generally Monica Feria Tinta, Due Process and the Right to Life in the Context
of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations: Arguing the La Grand Case, 12 EJIL
363 (2001).
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questionable clemency proceedings free from any checks by the judicial
branch. Furthermore, the United States’ declared its intention to discount
the importance of international law by withdrawing itself from the
VCCR Optional Protocol, thereby removing itself from the ICJ’s
jurisdiction.113
Finally, in the spring of 2008, the Supreme Court reheard the case
of Medellin v. Texas.114 Medellin was one of the 51 Mexican nationals
named in Avena.115 As noted above, the President had issued a
memorandum determining that the state courts were to give effect to the
ICJ decision.116 The Texas court found that the inmate was not entitled to
habeas relief because he failed to timely raise his VCCR claim.117 The
Supreme Court granted certiorari on the narrow issue of the legal effect
the United States must give to the ICJ’s decision in Avena regarding
Texas’ procedural denial of a successive habeas corpus review for
Medellin.118 The Supreme Court held that the ICJ’s Avena judgment,
although a binding international obligation, has no legal effect on the
United States because the VCCR is not self-executing.119 Therefore the
Supreme Courts hands are effectively tied in enforcing ICJ judgment in
the domestic setting until Congress implements legislation giving legal
effect to the VCCR.120 The Court further noted that the President’s
memorandum ordering Texas to stay execution of Medellin did not make
the VCCR self-executing.121 Therefore, under the current posture of the
VCCR, the Supreme Court has handed Congress the ultimate
responsibility to ensure that the United States complies with the VCCR
as to the remaining Mexican nationals in Avena.122 Failure to bring the
United States into compliance with the ICJ’s judgment will have
detrimental effects and undermine the reciprocal consular rights that
United States citizens have while traveling, working, and living
abroad.123
The Supreme Court in Breard and Sanchez-Llamas along with its
response to the ICJ rulings of La Grand and Avena effectively left
113

See generally Carter, supra note 103.
Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).
115
See id.
116
Id. at 1353.
117
Id.
118
Id.
119
Id.
120
Medellin, 128 S. Ct. at 1346.
121
Id. at 1371.
122
Lucy Reed, Speech delivered to the Malaysian Chapter of the Asian Society of
International Law: Treaties in US Domestic law: Medellin v. Texas in Context (Aug. 7,
2008) (transcript available at http://www.asil.org/files/lucy-malaysia.pdf).
123
Id.
114

2008]

VCCR ARTICLE 36

257

foreign nationals without any solace in domestic courts and stripped
foreign nationals the benefit of the United States’ adherence to
international proceedings.124 With the above outcomes in Article 36 cases
as a guiding light, “[o]ne can imagine that an appropriate remedy [falls] .
. . somewhere in the middle of two unacceptable extremes.”125 On one
end of the spectrum the remedy is diplomatic resolution.126 On the other
is the applicability of the exclusionary rule. In order for the court to even
consider the exclusionary rule, either the foreign national must have
raised the VCCR claim in state court (procedural default doctrine) or
have demonstrated that the foreign national was prejudiced and therefore
could not raise the VCCR claim in state court.127
Resolution through diplomatic channels is not an effective means
of redress on both political and philosophical grounds. During the ICJ
rulings, the United States ratified the Optional Protocol and submitted to
its jurisdiction, therefore the concept of equal treatment before law
should govern for American legal actions in the international context and
diplomatic resolution should not be the only remedy available.128 As a
matter of sound policy, it is contradictory that the United States enforced
Article 36 as the sending State in Iran and Nicaragua (in 1979 and 1986,
respectively) and is unwilling give other signatory nations equal
treatment when it concerns foreign nationals.129 Thus, the United States
“must demand more from its government than mere apologies for VCCR
violations.”130
The Supreme Court decisions of Breard and Sanchez effectively
limited recovery for Article 36 violations by imposing the bar of the
procedural default doctrine, a heavy burden of showing prejudice to
overcome it, and by limiting the remedies of suppression and exclusion
of evidence. In both LaGrand and Avena, the ICJ advised the Supreme
Court to implement review and reconsideration of the fate of foreign
nationals on death row because of a violation of their Article 36 right of
consular notification. But, because the Supreme Court ignored ICJ
guidance and handed Congress the ultimate responsibility in enacting
124
See generally Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. 331 (2006); Breard, 523 U.S. 371 (2008);
Cases Concerning Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. U.S.), 2004 I.C.J. 12,
64 (March 31); La Grand Case (Germany v. U.S.), 2001 I.C.J. 12 (June 27).
125
Cara Drinan, Process and the Right to Life in the Context of the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations: Arguing the La Grand Case 54 STAN. L.REV. 1303, 1314 (2002).
126
Id. The author discusses such resolutions as an apology or promise not to repeat
the same mistake.
127
Id.
128
Id
129
Id.
130
Drinan, supra note 125, at 1314.
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laws ensuring that the United States complies with the VCCR, lawyers
have begun to explore an alternate to recovery for Article 36 violations:
civil remedies.
CIVIL REMEDIES UNDER THE VIENNA CONVENTION
Many foreign nationals have headed in a new direction in seeking
remedies for VCCR violations after exhausting remedies at the criminal
level in both domestic and international forums. These litigants have
brought VCCR claims in the civil context under 42 U.S.C. §1983 and the
ATCA. Amidst the debate regarding the availability and scope of
criminal remedies for Article 36 violations, the current dispute plaguing
federal circuit courts is the issue of whether foreign nationals are
afforded civil remedies along with or in the absence of criminal
remedies. Breard stands for the proposition that the Supreme Court
conceded that Article 36 creates an individual right for foreign nationals
in the criminal context.131 Unfortunately, the Court makes no mention of
an individual right in the civil context.132 The Supreme Court’s silence
regarding a private right in the civil context paved the way for a federal
circuit split on this issue. Although there is only one circuit advocating
for civil remedies as a means for recourse for Article 36 violations, it was
the only case decided after the Supreme Court’s declaration that Article
36 arguably confers individual rights and therefore is reflective of the
approach federal and state courts should adopt.
In March 2007, in Jogi v. Voges, the Seventh Circuit considered the
novel issue of whether the federal courts had jurisdiction in proceedings
against state officials for civil suits for Article 36 non-compliance.133 The
Seventh Circuit concluded that foreign nationals may recover under
§1983.134 This opinion stands in contrast to the Fifth and Sixth Circuit
131

See generally Breard, 523 U.S. 371 (2006).
Id.
133
Chimene I. Keitner & Kendall C. Randall, The Seventh Circuit Again Finds
Jurisdiction for Private Remedies for Violations of Article 36 of the Vienna Convention
on Consular Relations, 11 (2007), available at: http://www.asil.org/insights070514.cfm.
134
See 42 U.S.C. §1983 (2000) (“Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other
person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any
action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s
judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was
violated or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of
Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be a
statute of the District of Columbia.”).
132
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who held that Article 36 did not confer a private right of action in civil
cases.135 A detailed review of this circuit split is insightful to determine
whether foreign nationals may rely on civil remedies as a last resort in a
quest for meaningful VCCR redress.
Jogi v. Voges: The Silver Lining in a Cloud of Article 36 Cases
The Seventh Circuit had initially decided Jogi v. Voges (“Jogi I”)
prior to the Supreme Court decision of Sanchez-Llamas which limited
criminal remedies through the procedural default doctrine.136 Jogi I is
notable for three main propositions: (1) that the court had subject matter
jurisdiction under both the general federal jurisdiction statute as well as
the ATCA Statute; (2) that VCCR was a self-executing treaty;137 and (3)
that the VCCR gives rise to an implied private right of action for
damages.138 Following the Supreme Court’s decision in Sanchez-Llamas,
regarding the limitation on the VCCR remedies, the Seventh Circuit
detracted from its decision in Jogi I, which considerably broadened the
scope of Article 36.139 The Seventh Circuit issued another opinion in Jogi
v. Voges (“Jogi II”) and withdrew part of its earlier decision in Jogi I. In
Jogi II, the Seventh Circuit limited its holding to the facts of the case and
refrained from making a sweeping decision that would expand the
135

See Sanchez-Llamas, 548 U.S. at 331.
Jogi II, 480 F.3d at 824.
137
See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS §111 (“In the absence of
special agreement, it is ordinarily for the United states to decide how it will carry out its
international obligations. Accordingly, the intention of the United States determines
whether an agreement is to be self-executing in the United States or should await
implementation by legislation or appropriate executive or administrative action. If the
international agreement is silent as to its self-executing character and the intention of the
United States is unclear, account must be taken of any statement by the President in
concluding the agreement or in submitting it to the Senate for consent or to the Congress
as a whole for approval, and of any expression by the Senate or by Congress in dealing
with the agreement. . . . After the agreement is concluded, often the President must decide
in the first instance whether the agreement is self-executing, i.e. whether existing law is
adequate to enable the United States to carry out its obligations, or whether new
legislation is necessary and, is required. . . . There . . . can be instances in which the
United States Constitution or previously enacted legislation will be fully adequate to give
effect to an apparently non-self executing international agreement.”); see also Carlos
Manuel Vazquez, The Four Doctrines of Self-Executing Theories, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 695,
696–97 (1995) (“First, legislative action is necessary if the parties to the treaty . . .
intended that the treaty’s object be accomplished through intervening acts of legislation.
Second, legislative action is necessary if the norm of the treaty establishes is ‘addressed’
as a constitutional matter to the legislature. Third, legislative action is necessary if the
treaty purports to accomplish what under our Constitution may be addressed only by
statute. Finally, legislation is necessary if no law confers a right of action on a plaintiff
seeking to enforce the treaty.”).
138
Jogi II, 480 F.3d at 824.
139
Id.
136
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decision’s scope larger than necessary to resolve the case.140 The Seventh
Circuit withdrew its decision granting subject matter jurisdiction under
the ATCA.141 The court held that whether the treaty violation Jogi
alleged amounted to a tort was unclear.142 Hesitant to create a holding
with broad implications, the Seventh Circuit cautiously concluded that:
“[w]e can safely leave for another day the question of whether the
[VCCR] would directly support a private remedy.”143 However, the court
conceded that a state actor’s failure to inform a foreign national of his
right to consular notification violates a federal right under a treaty.144
The facts of Jogi II differ from Breard, Sanchez-Llamas, and
Medellin because Jogi was not asserting his claim in a habeas corpus
petition. Jogi, an Indian national, was arrested for aggravated battery
with a firearm in Illinois.145 When Jogi turned himself in to the local
authorities, they questioned him and his mother about Jogi’s passport and
informed him of the possibility that he would have to return to his home
country of India, thus indicating they knew he was a foreign national.146
Jogi pleaded guilty, served half of his twelve-year sentence, and returned
to India upon deportation from the United States.147 From the time of his
arrest until he carried out his sentence, local law enforcement official
neither informed Jogi of his rights under Article 36, nor did they contact
the Indian consulate on his behalf.148 While in prison, Jogi learned about
the VCCR and his rights under Article 36. This led him to file a pro se
complaint praying for compensatory, nominal, and punitive damages for
Article 36 non-compliance.149
Jogi’s legal theory was based on 42 U.S.C. § 1983.150 The issue in
this case turned on whether the term “and laws” in § 1983 encompasses
all laws or is limited to a subset of laws.151 The Seventh Circuit held that
“laws” meant “all laws” based on its reading of the Supremacy Clause of
140

See id.
See generally Jogi II, 480 F.3d 823 (7th Cir. 2007).
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Jogi II, 480 F.3d at 825.
145
Id.
146
Jogi I, 425 F.3d at 370.
147
Id.
148
Id.
149
Jogi II, 480 F.3d at 825.
150
See 42 U.S.C. §1983 (“Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance,
regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured
by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. . . .”) (emphasis added).
151
Jogi II, 480 F.3d at 826.
141
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the Constitution which states: “the Constitution and the Laws of the
United States . . . and all Treaties made” are “the supreme law of the
land.”152 In order to block the floodgates of litigation based on this
reading of § 1983, the court outlined the requirements the plaintiff must
overcome before seeking relief of a violation of international treaty rights
under §1983. Most importantly, the court suggested that the treaty must
be self-executing153 and that Jogi was entitled to a remedy under the
statute.154 The Seventh Circuit noted that, thus far, the Supreme Court, as
well as most circuits, has refrained from deciding whether Article 36
implies a private right of action.155 Instead, the courts have assumed that
Article 36 confers a private right in order to proceed to the remedies
analysis—where most courts effectively limit any significant redress.156
The Seventh Circuit applied the same legal analytical framework
used in other cases to determine whether an implicit private right of
action exists.157 First, the court determined “whether the statute by its
terms grants private rights to any identifiable class” and second,
“whether the text of the statute is phrased in terms of the persons
benefited.”158 Looking to the plain language of Article 36, the court
found no clearer indication of a private right than the words “shall
inform the person concerned without delay of his rights under this subparagraph.”159 Furthermore, the court found that once again, the plain
language of the statute conferred this private right on an identifiable class
of people: foreign nationals.160
The Seventh Circuit retracted its holding regarding the ATCA. In
Jogi I, the court found jurisdiction for the ATCA claim under 28 U.S.C.
152

Id.; See also U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
The weight of this opinion may be compromised by the Supreme Court’s recent
holding in Medellin v. Texas in which the Court held that VCCR is not a self-executing
treaty. See Medellin, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008).
154
Jogi II, 480 F.3d at 827.
155
Jogi I, 425 F.3d 349.
156
Jogi II, 480 F.3d at 831.
157
Id.
158
Id. at 828; See also Jogi I, 425 F.3d at 377. The court found other factors
persuasive in determining the intent of a treaty to confer individual rights such as (1) the
language and purpose of the agreement as a whole; (2) the circumstances surrounding its
execution; and (3) the nature of the particular obligation imposed by the part of the
agreement under consideration. If however, the court finds that intent is clear from the
language, which it indeed did, it will apply the remaining factors. Jogi I, 425 F.3d at 377.
159
Id. at 833 (citing VCCR art. 36 at (1)(b), supra note 1) (emphasis added). The
court goes on to mention other sources that imply rights under Article 36 such as the
travaux preparatoires, the State Department’s Foreign Affairs Manual, the binding
interpretations of the ICJ who has definitively announced that Article 36 proffers
individually enforceable rights, and the court also reconciles the explicit grant of
individual right in Article 36 with the language of the Preamble. Id.
160
Jogi II, 480 F.3d at 835; See also supra note 1.
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§1350.161 The Seventh Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s decision in
Sosa v. Alvarez Machain where the Court concluded that the ATCA was
not enacted with the intent to “furnish jurisdiction for a relatively modest
set of actions alleging violations of the law of the nations.”162
Distinguishing this holding in Sosa, the Seventh Circuit held, in Jogi I,
the that subject matter jurisdiction was straightforward because Jogi was
asserting his claim under the violation of a treaty—the VCCR—and not
customary international law.163 Hence, the court decided that the issue of
what degree of customary law is considered federal law or federal
common law did not need to be entertained.164 Furthermore, the Seventh
Circuit found jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 which states that “the
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising
under the Constitution, laws, or treaties. . . .”165
The Seventh Circuit ultimately remanded the case to the district
court, finding jurisdiction under the ATCA, but refrained to decide
whether a violation under Article 36 is a tort.166 The court did, however,
indicate that an Article 36 violation could be construed as a “breach of
duty to disclose in the context of a special relationship” or a regulatory
violation.167 The Seventh Circuit in Jogi I alluded to the notion that, on
remand, the district court would most likely be able construe Article 36
violation as a tort.168 However, by withdrawing federal jurisdiction over
an ATCA claim arising out of an Article 36 violation, the Seventh
Circuit foreclosed the opportunity for district courts to engage in
meaningful evaluation of such a novel claim.169
The Fifth, Sixth, and Second Circuits: The Gray Clouds Restricting Civil
Remedies for Article 36 Violations
Although the Seventh Circuit limited private remedies under Article
36 violations to recovery exclusively under § 1983, the court ultimately
held that the language of Article 36 was intended to convey a private
right of action in the event of a violation.170 The Fifth, Sixth, and Second
161

Id.; See also 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2000) (which states in pertinent part: “The district
courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only
committed in violation of the law of nations or by a treaty of the United States”).
162
Jogi I, 425 F.3d at 372 (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692 (2004)).
163
Id.
164
Id. at 373.
165
28 U.S.C. §1331 (2000).
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Jogi I, 425 F.3d at 373.
167
Id. at 385.
168
See id.
169
See generally Jogi II, 480 F.3d 822.
170
See id.

2008]

VCCR ARTICLE 36

263

Circuits, on the other hand, came to a different conclusion, which
deprives foreign nationals of even a singular recovery under a §1983
cause of action.171 A discussion of these decisions is important for
understanding the split in rationale between the Seventh Circuit and the
Fifth, Sixth, and Second Circuits.
In United States v. Jimenez-Nava, Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) agents went to Jimenez-Nava’s apartment after suspecting
that he was an undocumented immigrant.172 Upon admitting that he was
illegally living in the United States, law enforcement officials arrested
Jimenez-Nava.173 At the INS office, the INS officials gave Jimenez-Nava
a standard notice of his rights, in Spanish, advising him of his right to
legal counsel and right to communicate with his consulate.174 JimenezNava testified that he declined his right to communicate with the
Mexican consul because he was not certain what the consul’s function
was.175 Perhaps even more importantly, he did not believe INS officials
would deport him.176 After his indictment, however, Jimenez-Nava
requested suppression of his statements and evidence because of a
violation of his Article 36 rights.177
When dealing with whether the VCCR created a private cause of
action, the Fifth Circuit likened treaties to international contracts
between and among independent nations, which do not create judicially
enforceable rights.178 As such, the court determined that the VCCR, a
standard international treaty, was subject to the same interpretation.179
Furthermore, the court looked to the VCCR’s preamble for support as
precluding the treaty to confer any individual rights for foreign
nationals.180
In disallowing private remedies for consular notification, the Fifth
Circuit rejected Jimenez-Nava’s arguments. First, Jimenez-Nava argued
that the clear language of Article 36 grants “rights” to foreign nationals.
The court pointed out that by relying on the text of Article 36, Jimenez
discounted the preamble as specifically “not to benefit individuals.”181
171
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F.3d 183 (2d Cir. 2008).
172
United States v. Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d 192,194 (5th Cir. 2001).
173
Id.
174
Id.
175
Id.
176
Id.
177
Jimenez-Nava, 243 F.3d at 194.
178
Id. at 195.
179
Id. at 196.
180
Id.
181
Id. at 197.

264

SETON HALL CIRCUIT REVIEW

[Vol. 5:239

The court summarized its disagreement by posing the rhetorical question:
“If the treaty cannot benefit [foreign nationals] . . . by creating
individually enforceable rights, how can . . . [the VCCR] intend to confer
enforceable rights on all foreign nationals detained in the receiving
state?”182 Next, the court rejected Jimenez-Nava’s argument that, similar
to any agreement, the VCCR may explicitly confer individual rights.183
The Fifth Circuit distinguished the Supreme Court precedent from the
case at bar determining the purpose and provisions of the extradition
treaty under issue directly pointed to an individual right, whereas the
explicit purpose of the VCCR is to outline consular privileges and
protections.184 Finally, Jimenez-Nava pointed to the United States
Department of State’s Foreign Affairs Manual and the “Memorandum of
Understanding on Consular Protection of Mexican and United States
Nationals” as asserting an individual’s right.185 The court rejected that
argument finding those documents only indicate the United States’
intention to abide by the treaty and in no way imply that violations of the
treaty are judicially enforceable.186 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit held that
Jimenez-Nava did not have a private right of action under Article 36 and
was not entitled to a remedy.187
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit, in United States v. Emuegbunam,188
found there was no private right of action for Article 36 violations.189 In
1998, Emuegbunam, a Nigerian national, was indicted for conspiring to
import 800 grams of a substance which contained heroin into the United
States.190 Emuegbunam claimed that law enforcement officials violated
his Article 36 rights by not informing him that he had a right to notify the
Nigerian consulate of his arrest.191 Despite a violation of Article 36, the
court was not convinced by Emuegbunam’s arguments and found no
private right of action.192
The Sixth Circuit relied on broad principles relating to international
agreements in support of the proposition that the VCCR does not confer
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private rights to individuals.193 For example, the court cited the
Restatement Third of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States
which states “[i]nternational agreements, even those directly benefitting
private persons, generally do not create private rights or provide for a
private cause of action in domestic courts. . . .”194 However, the Sixth
Circuit explained that the Supreme Court has recognized that the
particular treaty involved governs whether individual enforceable rights
exist, as they do in a narrow set of circumstances.195 Furthermore, the
Sixth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court, in Breard, conferred a
foreign national’s rights but left open the question of private right of
action.196
The Sixth Circuit did, however, note that federal courts have been
“[c]onfronted in recent years with numerous claims based upon the
Vienna Convention without the benefit of a definitive statement from the
Supreme Court, [and circuit courts have] whenever possible sidestepped
the question of whether the treaty creates individual rights. . . .”197 In the
end, the Sixth Circuit concluded that irrespective of the status on
enforceable private rights, Emuegbunam was not entitled to the relief he
sought: reversal of indictment and conviction.198
Most recently, the Second Circuit joined the majority of circuits in
Mora v. People of New York.199 In Mora, the plaintiff was an
incarcerated native and citizen of the Dominican Republic, charged with
attempted robbery in violation of New York State law.200 He was
interrogated without an interpreter and, although he told the arresting
officers he wished to speak with somebody in Spanish, he was appointed
counsel that did not speak Spanish and was coerced into taking a plea
without the benefit of an interpreter.201 In addition, though the prosecutor
and the arresting officials were aware of his status as a citizen of the
Dominican Republic, they never notified the consulate of the Dominican
Republic of his arrest.202 The Second Circuit held that the drafters of the
VCCR did not intend to include individual rights in the scope of the
treaty.203 The Second Circuit did not find persuasive the view that
193
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200
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Article 36 confers an individual right that can be remedied in a damages
action, expressed by the ICJ in Avena or La Grand, either directly204 or
indirectly through § 1983.205
The Second Circuit, indifferent to domestic obligations to
international law, made a series of insincere suggestions towards the
enforcement of the VCCR. The first solution proposed by the Second
Circuit was to provide the United States with the ability to sue state and
local governments in order to ensure compliance with the VCCR on a
local level.206 However, in Medellin v. Texas, although the President did
not sue the Texas government, he did issue a memorandum ordering a
stay of the execution of José Medellin as a result of Texas’ failure to
comply with the VCCR, but the Texas government chose to ignore the
President’s order and executed Medellin in spite of this memorandum.207
The second solution the Second Circuit proposed was to have the
domestic courts ask the foreign national whether the their consulate had
been given notice.208 The text of the VCCR clearly states that the
arresting authorities shall notify the foreign national’s consulate of his
arrest.209 Under this provision, the implementation of Article 36 lies in
the hands of federal or local law enforcement and is not within the
court’s power to micromanage compliance.210
Finally, the Second Circuit proposed that the foreign national
petition detaining or arresting officials, including courts of law, to
comply request compliance with obligations set forth in Article 36.211
Once again, the Second Circuit conflated the role of the foreign national
and of the arresting/detaining authorities.212 Not only is it the arresting
official’s duty to notify the foreign national’s consulate, as opposed to
the foreign national petitioning the arresting official to do so, a foreign
national more often than not is not aware of VCCR Article 36.
Furthermore, according to case law, and individual cannot raise an
204
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Medellin, 128 S. Ct. 1346, 1358 (2008).
205
Id. at 205.
206
Id. at 198.
207
See generally Medellin v. Texas, 128 S. Ct. 1346 (2008)
208
Id. at 198.
209
See VCCR art. 36(1)(b), supra note 1 (“if he so requests, the competent authorities
of the receiving State shall, without delay, inform the consular post of the sending State
if, within its consular district, a national of that State is arrested or committed to prison or
to custody pending trial or is detained in any other manner. Any communication
addressed to the consular post by the person arrested, in prison, custody or detention shall
also be forwarded by the said authorities without delay. The said authorities shall inform
the person concerned without delay of his rights under this sub-paragraph.”).
210
Id.
211
Mora, 524 F.3d at 198.
212
Id.

2008]

VCCR ARTICLE 36

267

Article 36 claim in an appellate level court or when the foreign national
learns of this right under Article 36, because the foreign national is
barred under the procedural default doctrine.213
The split among the circuits with respect to whether or not a private
right of action exists for an Article 36 violation has left foreign nationals
with little guidance as to how to pursue civil remedies under Article 36.
The Seventh Circuit found that Article 36 does contain a civil right
whereby a foreign national may recover under such vehicles as § 1983
while the Fifth, Sixth, and Second Circuits vehemently opposed these
rights. Nonetheless, many foreign nationals continue to bring Article 36
claims in both federal and state courts. The many litigation strategies at
play in initiating VCCR litigation reflects the impetus the VCCR serves
as a vehicle in international comity and legal obligations enforcement.
LITIGATION STRATEGIES
Two Legal Aid Society attorneys properly noted that: “[a]n often
overlooked yet potentially fruitful area of litigation for . . . criminal
defense attorney[s] concerns utilizing the [VCCR] in the representation
of foreign nationals.”214 The high volume in Article 36 litigation
indicates that more than mere case victories lies at stake in Article 36
litigation. Several rationales exist to explain the increase in Article 36
litigation during the past decade.215 These litigation strategies include: (1)
an attempt to make the United States aware that it deviates significantly
with the international community regarding its jurisprudence; (2) also
that the United States seems to favor enforcement of trade-related treaties
over international human rights treaties; (3) that by creating federal
litigation at the circuit level, attorneys are hopeful that the Supreme
Court will grant certiorari and answer these pressing issues for once and
for all; and (4) because the VCCR was found to be not self-executing,
attorneys are trying to find other mechanisms that do not require
implementing legislation as a means to bring Article 36 claims.
First, cases brought by foreign nationals, as well as those brought
by the home countries of foreign nationals, have forced the United States
to recognize that a rift exists between United States jurisprudence and the
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international community.216 This is evidenced by LaGrand,217 where
Germany urged future compliance with Article 36 and argued that
violations of Article 36 cannot be remedied by apologies or the
distribution of leaflets alone.218 Instead, as argued by Germany,
violations must be remedied by changes to United States law.219 This
need for change is especially important in cases in which the foreign
national is sentenced to death. Presumably, Germany wanted to
emphasize its disagreement with both the United States’ jurisprudence as
well as the United States’ use of capital punishment. The disagreement
with the latter idea mirrors a general disapproval of this practice on an
international level.220 This interpretation of Germany’s approach seems
especially plausible in light of the ICJ cases, LaGrand and Avena, as well
as the fact that a majority of domestic cases involve foreign nationals
awaiting capital punishment.221 It may be argued that VCCR litigation is
a call to action to abolish the death penalty—at least in those states that
have not already done so.
A second strategy that seems to be at play is creating state and
federal court awareness of VCCR violations because, although the
influence of international law is expanding domestically, courts seem
reluctant to adhere to international law where it concerns human rights
violations. The unfortunate truth is that many state and federal courts are
impervious to LaGrand; in fact, some are even unaware of the VCCR’s
existence.222 To that end, there is speculation that attorneys are bringing
VCCR claims as a demand to the United States to adhere to promises
made under the U.N. Charter Article 94(1) and thereby binding the
United States to comply with ICJ rulings.223
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A third approach involves forcing the Supreme Court to address the
issue by creating a storm of litigation on Article 36 in which the circuit
courts will be unable to come to an agreement on the status of individual
and private rights. As some circuit courts have noted,224 the ICJ decisions
hold little more than a persuasive force on domestic courts. Therefore, it
is advantageous for litigants to bring claims in lower courts and hope that
eventually this flood of litigation will result in a Supreme Court grant of
certiorari and a subsequent decision of binding law on this narrow issue.
A decision by the Supreme Court would provide guidance to courts on
how to interpret and implement the ICJ decisions. The decision will also
answer many burning questions, such as: (1) what remedies will be
available; (2) whether there is in fact an individual right of action for
Article 36 violations; (3) whether the VCCR is self-executing; and (4)
what are the effects of the procedural default doctrine and the Supremacy
Clause in the VCCR context.
Further, Article 36 claims in criminal and civil proceedings provide
an attorney with many practical advantages. Setting aside potential
negative ramifications,225 seeking consular involvement at the outset can
serve a great benefit to defense counsel.226 Filing a motion requesting the
state to formally advise the defendant of his right to consular notification
as well as notifying the consulate would perhaps lead to consular
involvement not otherwise available to detainees. For example, the
consulate may facilitate communication between the foreign national and
his attorney, provide translation assistance to overcome language
barriers, explain the structure and nuances of the criminal justice system,
secure supplementary counsel, and assist in locating and acquiring
critical evidence abroad.227 Furthermore, continued use of the channels of
consular assistance and increased litigation may lead to positive
legislation on the state level which in turn leads to deliberate and
significant steps towards domestic enforcement of international law.228
A final proxy enforcement mechanism involves the most recent
litigation in the cases of Jogi II in the Seventh Circuit and Mora in the
Second Circuit.229 In these cases, counsel for foreign nationals utilized
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the ATCA to obtain relief for the VCCR violations.230 Because causes of
action under the ATCA generally “mirror developments of international
law,”231 the benefit of using the ATCA is that it grants jurisdiction and
provides for a substantive cause of action for treaty violations and the
law of nations.232 More importantly, because the status of the VCCR as a
self-executing treaty was not yet resolved at the time of these decisions,
courts consider the ATCA as implementing language for treaties in
certain contexts.233 Therefore, the ATCA is a supplemental proxy that
defense counsel uses as an alternative to criminal remedies in attaining
civil remedies such as monetary damages or injunctive relief.234
Regardless of the motive, there has been an increase in VCCR
claims in state and federal court. Often, these claims are quickly
extinguished because the procedural default doctrine bars review, no
prejudice is found, or no meaningful remedies are available. The inquiry
then becomes: are domestic courts ducking international obligations
wholesale or only in certain instances, such as human rights violations?
A review of United States’ enforcement of international law and treaties
in other areas such as trade and environmental law provides some insight
on this question.
BEYOND VCCR, INTERNATIONAL OBLIGATIONS IN OTHER
CONTEXTS
Of the international treaties ratified by the United States,
international trade treaties are widely upheld in domestic courts, while
human rights treaties and other public interest treaties, such as
environmental treaties, are not enforced in the same way. The oral
argument in Medellin gave the Supreme Court justices a chance to play
devil’s advocate and stump counsel for both sides with an assortment of
hypotheticals.235 One such hypothetical, mentioned at least twice during
oral argument, was the treatment of international agreements or
commitments such as NAFTA and WTO—United States’ trade
obligations.236 Justice Breyer posed an important question: “[T]he WTO
interprets a treaty. It interprets a treaty that binds the United States, just
like the ICJ is interpreting a treaty that binds the United States. So what’s
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the difference?”237 Ted Cruz, counsel for the United States, answered that
NAFTA is not a treaty; rather, it is a congressional agreement which
applies facts to specific circumstances. On the other hand, the ICJ does
not have binding effect in United States Courts.238 Furthermore, Justice
Scalia stated that ICJ rulings do not become binding on United States
Courts until a United States law is enacted.239 As conceded by two
Justices of the Supreme Court, international trade agreements and
verdicts based on a violation of these agreements bind the United States,
even though the United States is lending jurisdiction to a foreign
tribunal.240 Unfortunately for many foreign nationals, the rulings of the
ICJ do not hold such weight.
Scholars have presented various reasons for the disregard of Article
36 claims in domestic courts. The most cynical rationale given for the
disregard of ICJ rulings has been an ideological opposition to the role of
the ICJ.241 This rationale, however, would not hold water if the VCCR
was self-executing or a law was enacted to give the VCCR effect because
this would make the treaties the supreme law of the land and would not
allow judges to enforce the treaties on a discretionary basis.242 Another
rationale is that heightened protections for foreigners in the United States
is a hard sell due to the continued war on terror.243
In the face of the United States’ disregard of the VCCR and other
international treaties, it is imperative that the United States determine a
solution to this problem it has created. The United States must restore
faith in the international community that it will stand by its international
commitments and obligations. A look into the tangled web of problems
the United States has created and their ramifications leads to a discussion
of potential solutions that the United States should adopt immediately.
PROBLEMS, RAMIFICATIONS, AND SOLUTIONS
The United States’ non-enforcement of the ICJ rulings, its
noncompliance with the VCCR, and the domestic courts’ procedural and
237
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substantive hurdles to VCCR victories has had a ripple effect on both the
domestic and the international communities. Foreign nationals raising
VCCR claims in domestic courts are faced with four hurdles: (1) the
procedural default doctrine, which requires foreign nations to raise
VCCR claims in state court; (2) the requirement that foreign nationals
must convincingly argue that the Article 36 confers individual rights; (3)
foreign nationals must show that the violation resulted in prejudice, and
(4) foreign nationals must propose an appropriate remedy. Each of these
hurdles is extremely burdensome for a foreign national if not completely
impossible to achieve given the present status of VCCR litigation.
Procedural Default Doctrine
In the LaGrand decision, the ICJ noted that the United States’
procedural default doctrine “frustrates the purpose for which the rights . .
. are intended.”244 The ICJ reasoned that a foreign national’s ability to
bring VCCR claims was effectively and illogically barred.245 In order to
raise an Article 36 violation on appeal, the claim must be raised in state
court.246 However, foreign nationals cannot raise that claim in state court
proceedings because the foreign national only learns of the violation after
state court proceedings. Consequently, the procedural default doctrine
bars review of Article 36 violations.247
A solution to this procedural default doctrine problem lies with the
Legislative Branch. Congress can amend the habeas corpus statute to
allow federal courts jurisdiction to hear procedurally defaulted claims,
or, in the alternative, allow district courts to order a new trial or a new
sentencing phase for Article 36 violations. This is an effective solution
because it would take the majority of VCCR claims to the next stage of
review. Furthermore, this change in habeas corpus law is relatively easy
to implement as Congress has broad discretion to define the scope of
federal habeas corpus relief.248
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Individual Rights
In both LaGrand and Avena, the ICJ affirmatively concluded that
Article 36 confers individual rights upon foreign nationals.249 However,
many federal and state courts still hold otherwise.250 Other courts, while
holding that Article 36 does confer individual rights, sidestep a complete
analysis that would require placing the claim through procedural and
substantive hoops.251 Furthermore, the majority of decisions do not
support contentions that there is no individually enforceable right with
any substantive legal doctrine or authority.252 Apparently, there is no
dialogue between domestic courts and the ICJ rulings. Therefore, the
Supreme Court must give guidance to both federal and state courts on
this issue because the federal circuit split arises out of a perception that
the Supreme Court is at odds with ICJ rulings.253
Prejudice Analysis
Prejudice analysis plays a critical role in VCCR litigation because it
is the middle and crucial step, coming after procedural default and before
remedy determination. After procedural default doctrine, this is where
most litigants face a closed case on an Article 36 claim. Domestic courts
have put the burden of proof solely on the foreign national in VCCR
claims.254 In placing the burden of proof on the foreign national, courts
employ one of two tests. The first test is a general test requiring the
foreign national to adduce proof that he was in fact prejudiced by Article
36 noncompliance.255 The second and more frequently used test is the
three-prong test.256 First, the foreign national must establish that “he did
not know of his right to consult with consular officials.” Second, had the
foreign national known of the right, “he would have availed himself of
that right. . . .” Third, “there is a likelihood that the contact would have
resulted in assistance. . . .”257 This seems counterintuitive, as one who
has suffered disadvantages in his representation from the start now has a
heavy burden placed on him to prove that the VCCR violation is
249
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prejudicial.258 Because in most VCCR claims a violation of consular
notification is conceded, the litigant and the court should share this
burden in order to ensure that where the litigant has poor representation,
the court will conduct an independent inquiry into whether the violation
has indeed prejudiced the litigant.259
Under the more frequently used three-prong test, the first prong’s
burden of proof should be flipped to the prosecution to show that the
foreign national knew of his rights and chose not to exercise these rights.
Making the foreign national prove his ignorance is illogical.260 The
second prong assumes that what the foreign national did immediately
after the violation serves as a proxy for what he would have done had he
been informed of his rights at that time.261 The third prong, however, is
the most problematic. Under this prong, the reviewing court assumes that
the conduct occurring after a VCCR violation is indicative of what would
not have happened had the consulate intervened, whereas it is possible
that the consulate could have assisted in a fundamentally different
manner than that assumed.262 For example, the consulate may not have
given the same advice after the foreign national made a statement as he
would have if the foreign national had not yet made the statement.
Similarly, the consulate may have been contacted immediately on
notification but may have been unreachable until a later date, providing
for a different outcome than the court presupposes.263
A reformulation of the second prejudice test has been proposed and
is a better reflection of logic and fairness than when courts place the
burden of proving prejudice on the defendant.264 The first reformulated
prong calls for the individual to demonstrate through an affidavit of a
state official that his state consulate would have aided him if notified.265
This keeps the spirit of the original third prong intact, but clarifies its
application and still requires the foreign national to prove the burden in a
meaningful way.266 The second reformulated prong asks the foreign
national to demonstrate that he knew of his right of consular notification
under Article 36 and voluntarily chose not to exercise it.267 This shifts the
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burden to the United States to prove otherwise.268 The third reformulated
prong (as an alternative to the second reformulated prong) asks the
receiving state to demonstrate that law enforcement officials notified the
consulate of the foreign national’s arrest or detention and that the
consulate chose not to act upon the notification. 269 This would complete
the inquiry by showing that although the Article 36 rights were violated,
the foreign national was not prejudiced because the state’s consulate
refused to come to his aid.270
Remedy
The ICJ did not specify an appropriate remedy for Article 36
violations.271 In fact, the ICJ left the remedy determination to domestic
courts which would give “full effect” to the purpose and meaning of
Article 36.272 The United States did not adhere to the ICJ’s ruling
because domestic courts made no meaningful remedies available to
foreign nationals.273
A remedies inquiry under VCCR violations can only be undertaken
after the foreign national has overcome the procedural default and
prejudice inquiry hurdles. However, even when prejudice is established,
an appropriate remedy for an Article 36 violation is unclear.274 Foreign
nationals have sought suppression of incriminating statements, new
trials, and/or commutation of a death sentence.275 Foreign nationals have
argued that under the Restatement Third of Foreign Relations, the
appropriate recovery for a treaty violation is to “restore the status quo
ante” and therefore, this remedy should be employed for the violation of
the VCCR.276 Until recently, only Rangel-Gonzales, a Washington state
court case, has granted suppression of statement as an Article 36
remedy.277 Other courts have reasoned that no other country has applied
such a remedy and therefore it would be “self-limiting” to apply such a
remedy to an Article 36 violation in the United States.278 Some courts
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have gone as far as denying the possibility of any remedy for a VCCR
violation.279
The first proposed solution, by Sarah Ray, to the remedy problem is
that the Supreme Court should fashion a remedy that binds all state and
federal courts.280 It is within the Supreme Court’s power to fashion a
remedy for international treaty violations. Seeing as how there is an
existing conflict among the circuits as to the appropriate remedy, only
the Supreme Court has the ability to address this issue adequately.281
Alternatively, in cases where a foreign national’s “life” is not literally on
the line, a civil damages remedy is a plausible solution. First, civil
remedies may provide future deterrence if the government recognizes the
threat posed by an increase in expensive VCCR litigation and related
expenses. Therefore, the government will be more inclined to enforce
Article 36 compliance. Article 36 cases have been brought under §1983
and other revolutionary vehicles, and may offer substantive relief—
possibly pushing courts to apply appropriate remedies such as exclusion
and preventing federal habeas.282
CONCLUSION
The VCCR is a multilateral treaty ratified by 170 nations, including
the United States.283 While the VCCR generally outlined consular
privileges and immunities, the United States and other nations strongly
advocated for the inclusion of Article 36, which deviated from the basic
purpose of the VCCR and conferred rights of consular notification and
assistance for foreign nationals upon a foreign national’s arrest.284 Yet,
foreign nationals arrested in the United States have consistently been
deprived of consular notification by law enforcement officials and have
been stripped of any meaningful remedy for Article 36 violations.285 The
United States has been consistently disregarded its international legal
obligations, particularly in the human rights arena.286 As such, many
American and international lawyers have brought claims under Article
36 invoking many litigation strategies, most notably using Article 36 as a
proxy enforcement mechanism to force the United States to comply with
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its international comity and legal obligations.287 Unfortunately, there has
been no noteworthy progress towards achieving this end.
Foreign nationals face many setbacks in successfully bringing an
Article 36 claim. The first of these setbacks is the procedural default
doctrine which bars foreign nationals from bringing Article 36 cases in
federal court when they have not raised the issue in state court.288 This
requirement is unfair as most foreign nationals do not find out about their
Article 36 rights until after the state tr1ial.289 Therefore, the federal
habeas corpus statute should be amended to allow foreign nationals to
bring Article 36 claims in federal court without first raising them in state
court.290 The second setback is the prejudice inquiry—a court undergoes
this inquiry to determine if the foreign national was prejudiced and
therefore could not bring his claim in state court.291 The current prejudice
test used by most courts places an undue and counterintuitive burden of
proof on the foreign national.292 To remedy this, courts should adopt one
of the reformulated prejudice tests discussed above.293 Finally, foreign
nationals face the setback of no meaningful remedy.294 Although, the
Supreme Court has precluded suppression of evidence and reversal of
indictment as available remedies under Article 36, the Court has yet to
prescribe a tangible remedy to foreign nationals.295 Hence, the Court
should fashion a remedy that would be binding on all domestic courts.296
Faced with the absence of success on the criminal level, many
foreign nationals have sued for monetary damages using vehicles such as
§1983 and the ATCA.297 The federal circuit courts are split as to whether
Article 36 does indeed confer private rights to foreign nationals. To solve
this problem and provide some solace to civil litigants for Article 36
violations, the Supreme Court should affirmatively declare that the
Article 36 does indeed grant an individual the right of consular
notification instead of holding in dicta that “Article 36 arguably confers
an individual right.”298 This is essential to resolve the circuit split and
equally essential to give foreign nationals recourse for Article 36
violations they are legally entitled to under international law.
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